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THE LOCKE REPUBLICAN DEBATE AND THE 
PARADOX OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE· 
DAVID SCHULTZ·· 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent debates surrounding the intellectual and ideological origin 
of the American Founding I have primarily focused upon whether the 
basis of early American political thought is either Lockean or Republi­
can in character.2 These debates question which of several differing 
philosophies most influenced colonial leaders and the subsequent de­
velopment of American legal history. According to one view, the 
more influential philosophy was a Liberal tradition originating with 
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government3 that stressed the impor­
• Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 1990 annual Northeastern 
Political Science Association Convention, Providence, Rhode Island and the 1990 annual 
Pennsylvania Political Science Association Convention, Williamsport, Pennsylvania. 
•• B.A., Harper College; M.A., Rutgers University; M.A., State University of New 
York at Binghamton; Ph.D., University of Minnesota; Assistant Professor, Gustavus 
Adolphus College. 
1. "Founding" refers to the political character or political values that were impor­
tant in the formulation of early American and subsequent political thought. 
2. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATI..ANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADmON 506-53 (1975) [hereinafter 
POCOCK I]; Pocock, Republicanism and Ideo/agia Americana, 1987 J. HIST. IDEAS 325-46 
[hereinafter Pocock II]; see also G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 
1776-1787, 100-03, 106-07, 424-25, 429, 611 (1969) (discussing the demise of "classical 
politics"). See generally J. DIGGINS, THE LoST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLmcs: VIRTUE, 
SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984); L. HARTZ, THE LIB­
ERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3-5 (1983). 
3. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (T. Cook ed. 1947) (Chiswell ed. 
1680). 
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tance of political liberty, limited government, a natural rights philoso­
phy, and a right to property, among other values.4 Proponents of the 
other approach argue that the more influential philosophy was a Re­
pUblican tradition, inspired most directly by James Harrington's The 
Commonwealth o/Oceana,s that emphasized political liberty, equality, 
popular government, a fear of political corruption, and a linkage be­
tween property ownership, distribution, and political power in soci­
ety.6 Still another and perhaps more practical view stressed the 
influence of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws 0/ 
England.7 
Until recently, such debates concerning the nature of the philoso­
phies which influenced the development of early American law were 
only of academic interest to historians and political scientists. Today, 
this issue has taken on new meaning and become a subject of interest 
among lawyers and constitutional scholars. Debate in the legal com­
munity is now focused on the importance of the repUblican tradition in 
America as it relates to issues of constitutional interpretation, adjudi­
cation, and the determination of the federal judiciary'S role in Ameri­
can politics.8 Siding with either the Lockean or Republican position9 
may commit a person to a set of politics that either advocates a power­
ful regulatory state or is inherently sympathetic to individual liberty or 
4. II id. 11 124. 
5. J. HARRINGTON, THE CoMMONWEALTH OF OcEANA (1656), reprinted in J. 
POCOCK, THE POLrnCAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155-361 (1977) [hereinafter 
POCOCK III]. The Republican tradition was also remotely influenced by Roman and other 
classical writers such as Aristotle. 
6. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 385-89. 
7. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (rev. ed. 1979) 
(1st ed. 1765-1769); see. e.g., F. McDONALD, Novus DRDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEC­
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10-24 (1985); Lutz, The Relative Influence ofEuro­
pean Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 189, 189-91 (1984). 
8. See. e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrnCAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitu­
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Fallon, What Is Republicanism. and Is It Worth Reviving?, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American 
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Michelman, Traces ofSelf­
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the RepUblican Revival, 97 
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29 (1985). The issue of the American Founding and the Republican Revival in con­
stitutionallaw dominated volume 97, issue 8 of the Yale Law Journal (1988) and volume 
29, issue 1 of the William and Mary Law Review (1987). 
9. See infra notes 27-84 and accompanying text for an explanation of Republican 
and Lockean values. 
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perhaps occasionally indifferent to it.IO 
These studies have been insightful, but they have also been remiss 
in at least two ways. First, they have.been preoccupied with the exclu­
sivity of either the Lockean or Republican character of the Founding 
while ignoring the existence of other political traditions, II including 
the importance and emergence of an American legal tradition indebted 
to Blackstone,12 as rival and significant influences upon political de­
bate in early American history. This is especially odd in the case of 
scholarly legal commentary. 
Second, dominant interpretations of the American Founding have 
been confined to political rhetoric or have been concerned only with 
what colonial and early Americans have said about politics and polit­
ical issues, regardless of the context or the existence of other and per­
haps contradictory assertions about the same or similar subject. 13 
These interpretations do not adequately address how the Lockean or 
Republican rhetoric permeated political consciousness and influenced 
the way Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries acted 
upon their political beliefs. These approaches also fail to link political 
utterances to other kinds of pronouncements on the same or similar 
subjects. As Michael Lienesch noted in his study of the sources of 
early American political thought,14 many scholars ignore the many 
10. S. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DocTRINE: LocKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4-5 (1990). 
11. Other commentators have claimed that American political thought is indebted to 
Puritan and Calvinist religious thought. W. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN 
AMERICA 112-32 (1973); P. MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 1-15 (1956). 
Others credit Scottish Enlightenment thOUght. See. e.g., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING 
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST ix (1981). For a criticism of the latter, see Draper, Hurne & 
Madison: The Secrets of Federalist Paper No. 10, 58 ENCOUNTER 34 (1983). Several au­
thors have also noted the appearance of other "tongues" or influences in early American 
political thought. Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion ": The Discourse ofPolitics in 
1787,45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 3-7 (1988). 
12. For discussion relating to the influence of Blackstone on early America, see F. 
McDoNALD, supra note 7, at 10-24; D. LocKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1938); . 
L. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE (1938); Lutz, supra note 7, at 193; Whelan, Prop­
erty as Artifice: Hurne and Blackstone, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 102-03 (J. Pennock & 
J. Chapman eds. 1980). 
13. R. HANSON, THE DEMOCRA~IC IMAGINATION IN AMERICA: CoNVERSATIONS 
WITH OUR PAST 22-53 (1985). Hanson described liberal democracy as a "rhetorical tradi­
tion" that engages in the essential contest over the meaning of key liberal terms. ld. at 28. 
Hanson, however, confined his study or understanding of political terms to the level of 
rhetoric and failed to engage the political/legal and institutional forces that may have 
shaped or questioned the influence of the language and theory that he wished to examine. 
See id. 
14. M. LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988). 
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different languages or "persuasions" that influenced the Founders. 
Lienesch observed that "because of the porous and penetrable nature 
of these persuasions, a thinker of the time could even be attracted si­
multaneously to contradictory or even mutually exclusive concepts." IS 
In his defense of a Lockean-Liberal interpretation of the American 
Founding that challenged the Republican interpretation, J.P. Diggins 
noted that historical scholarship on the American Founding reveals 
that specific political language was used, but not why it was used or 
how the language influenced action. 16 
The need to explain how specific political vocabulary influenced 
actions in early American history leads to an interesting problem for 
any interpretation of the American Founding. If any theory about the 
Founding is to be considered viable, it must not only accurately de­
scribe the political rhetoric used, but must also explain how such rhet­
oric was translated into political action and into the creation of 
politicalllegal institutions indebted to a particular political philoso­
phy. In short, any viable interpretation must demonstrate some en­
during institutional legacy associated with that language beyond the 
level of political rhetoric in order to claim that the language has in fact 
significantly influenced American politics beyond some semantic 
leve1. 17 Present arguments concerning the Founding have thus far 
failed to do this because these arguments have not attempted to go 
beyond the rhetoric of a particular language to see how it manifested 
itself in concrete political institutions. 
This article presents a discussion of early American political theo­
ries and outlines some of the commentary in this area. The article 
then discusses state law on property rights and eminent domain as one 
means to examine the above claims and to clarify current debates con­
cerning the character of the foundations of American politics. This 
article proposes that present debates over a specific American political 
character have been too abstract, unhistorical, and confined to the 
level of political rhetoric. The debates have ignored the more impor­
tant and specific institutional influence these values mayor may not 
have had at different times in early American history. Examination of 
early state law offers a test of the strength or depth of how a particular 
tradition moved from the realm of political debate, permeated political 
15. Id. at 13. 
16. J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 361. 
17. This suggests that not all acts of speech are necessarily speech-arts, or that not all 
types of utterances are necessarily speech-acts. For a discussion of speech-acts, see J. Aus­
TIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). 
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consciousness, and influenced the actual development of American 
law. 
This article then proposes that neither the Lockean nor the Re­
publican tradition is a satisfactory or complete explanation of nine­
teenth century law regarding property rights and eminent domain. 
This article argues that the failure of either theses to concretely influ­
ence the area of property rights at specific times raises questions about 
how satisfactory these general claims about American political values 
are when forced to demonstrate influence on a non-rhetorical level. 
Specific legal treatment of property in early America demonstrates 
how the Founders may have said one thing in their political pro­
nouncements but did another in actual political practice. This para­
dox makes it difficult to claim that our Founding or subsequent 
history was exclusively Liberal or RepUblican, or that either of the 
main theories of the American Founding can exclusively account for 
how early Americans actually acted in regard to what they said, at 
least in regard to an important political concept such as property. 
I. PROPERTY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The concept of property rights had an important yet ambiguous 
role in early American politics, political theory, and law. One purpose 
of the right to property was to define and limit legislative power and to 
preserve individual liberty by providing a defense against the arbitrary 
and intrusive power of the state. For example, James Madison de­
scribed property broadly to include an individual's opinions and be­
liefs.18 He argued that "[p ]roperty as well as personal rights ... is an 
essential object of the laws" necessary to the promotion of free govern­
ment. 19 Alexander Hamilton stated that the preservation of private 
property was essential to liberty and a republican government.20 
Thomas Jefferson depicted property as a "natural right" of mankind.2 I 
John Adams described a proper balance of property in society as im­
portant to maintaining republican government.22 Thomas Paine felt 
18. VI THE WRmNGS OF JAMES MADISON 101-03 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) [hereinafter 
J. MADISON] (reprinting a piece by Madison which appeared in The National Gazette on 
March 29, 1792). 
19. P. LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 156 (1930); J. MADISON, 
supra note 18, at 101. 
20. J. CooKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 78 (1982); THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 587­
88 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in 
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 396-97 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). 
22. McKeon, The Development of the Concept ofProperty in Political Philosophy: A 
Study in the Background of the Constitution, 48 INT'L J. OF ETHICS 297,356-57 (1938). 
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that the state was instituted to protect the natural right of property,23 
and Noah Webster would later link property to virtue, freedom, and 
power.24 Finally, numerous Anti-Federalists described a society as 
free when it protected property rights or equalized property distribu­
tions.25 While these two notions might lead to contradictory state ac­
tions, this contradiction was apparently not evident to most 
Republicans. 
While current debates stress the importance of either Lockean­
Liberalism or the Atlantic Republican tradition as key to understand­
ing the character of early American politics,26 these are only two of at 
least three political theories and views on property that were impor­
tant in colonial America and at the time of the writing of the Constitu­
tion. The third relates to the writings of Sir William Blackstone. This 
article briefly reviews these three political views. 
A. John Locke and the Naturalness of Property Rights 
The writings of John Locke arguably had the most influence on 
early America. This influence has been noted by many scholars.27 
For example, Steven Dworetz, in his examination of the appeal of 
Locke's political philosophy prior to and during the American 
Revolution, claimed that Locke was the most frequently cited source 
among the colonists during the Revolutionary Era.28 Carl Becker ar­
gued that Locke's influence can be traced to the writings of Jefferson, 
especially in certain passages in the Declaration of Independence.29 
Specifically, Becker noted how Jefferson's adoption of Locke's views 
on the right to revolution and a natural rights philosophy and even the 
23. Id. at 353. 
24. M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 93. 
25. Bryan, Letter of Centinel, I, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SE­
LECTED DOCUMENTS 141 (J. Lewis ed. 1967); Winthrop, Letter of Agrippa, II, in ANTI­
FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra, at 161; Winthrop, 
Letter of Agrippa, III, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED Docu­
MENTS, supra, at 163; Winthrop, Letter of Agrippa, IV, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS 
FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra, at 166. 
26. See supra notes 27-84 and accompanying text for a description of the two sides to 
this debate. 
27. J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 60-61; L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 6; T. PANGLE, 
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LocKE 2 (1988). 
28. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 43-44. In his examination of Revolutionary War 
era citations to Locke, Dworetz noted over 760 references to the philosopher. Id. at 44. 
This number reflects a greater number of references to Locke than to any other individual. 
Id. at 45. 
29. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HIS­
TORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1970). 
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occurrence of the phrase "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"3o 
in the Declaration of Independence indicated that the Founding Fa­
thers read and were influenced by Locke.31 Thomas Pangle, in his 
analysis of Republican and Lockean thOUght in colonial America, 
claimed that the Founders interpreted classical Republican thought 
through the writings of Locke.32 The result of such a "filtered" inter­
pretation was to make Locke's philosophy superior to that of its chief 
ideological rival, Republicanism. Louis Hartz made the first and per­
haps the most influential argument that American political thought is 
indebted to Locke. Hartz argued that Locke is "America's philoso­
pher" and that American political thought is essentially Lockean.33 
Even J.G.A. Pocock, one of the staunchest defenders of the Republi­
can thesis, acknowledged the influence of Locke's views, although he 
. disagreed on the matter of their importance.34 Despite disagreements, 
these writers and others acknowledge that Locke's views on property 
influenced colonial as well as post-colonial political debate.3s 
Locke's theory of property has been interpreted as justifying both 
modern capitalist accumulation and traditional Christian natural 
laws.36 While both of these interpretations have some merit, the bour­
geois interpretation of Locke37 was not the Locke the colonists and 
Founders read. Instead, the bourgeois Locke did not emerge perhaps 
30. See II J. LocKE, supra note 3, ~ 87 (Locke discussed "life, liberty, and estate"). 
31. C. BECKER, supra note 29, at 27. 
32. T. PANGLE, supra note 27, at 2, 35. 
33. L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 59-61. Hartz's evidence for this claim rests in his 
analysis of several historical periods in American history, for example, the American 
Revolution, the Civil War, and the Progressive Era, and in his subsequent demonstration 
that the political issues debated during these periods were conducted in essentially Lockean 
terms. Id. 
34. See POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 423-24. 
35. See J. DIGGINS, supra note 2, at 192-229; L. HARTZ, supra note 2, at 17-18; P. 
LARKIN, supra note 19, at 154-56; II V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT 287 (1930); Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864, 872-80 
(1932). 
36. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: 
HOBBES TO LocKE 245 (1962). Macpherson argued that Locke's discussions of money, 
property, and accumulation throughout his writings point to a political philosophy that 
supports capitalist acquisition and logic. Macpherson labeled this political philosophy 
"possessive individualism." Id. at 263-71. A different view of Locke discounted the capi­
talist ethos in Locke's writings and concluded that there was a strong Christian influence to 
his writings. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 246 (1965); J. TuLLY, A 
DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LocKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 130, 175 (1980). In 
criticizing Macpherson's reading of Locke, Strauss stated, "Locke's doctrine of property is 
directly intelligible today if it is taken as the classic doctrine of 'the spirit of capitalism' 
...." L. STRAUSS, supra, at 246. 
37. The interpretation of Locke as a philosopher that sustains capitalism often de­
scribes him as the "bourgeois" Locke. 
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until the nineteenth century. 38 What these interpretations ignore is 
the important political character of Locke's theory of property rights 
in the Two Treatises, and the historical context of the Two Treatises as 
a radical Whig political argument against the Tories and the power of 
the British Crown during the 1680s and 1690s.39 
For the Founders, in opposition to the abuses of the Crown, 
Locke's ideas defended the principles of limited government, the natu­
ral rights of men, and the right to revolution. Thus, it was in this 
context that the early American conception of property was situated. 
Accordingly, the history of Locke's theory of property is primarily 
political, with the language of property used to defend the political 
liberty of Englishmen (including the colonies) against the Crown.4O 
As noted by Becker and others, it was this political linkage of property 
to personal power that was most influential on America. 41 
Locke argued in both the First and Second Treatises that the pro­
tection of property is the goal of civil society.42 Locke proposed that 
property is a natural and pre-political institution given to man by God. 
A property interest gives the owner a singular and absolute control 
over something which no one, including the state, could violate.43 
Property ownership of a thing44 was based upon ownership of one's 
body and labor such that anything mixed with the labor of a person 
38. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 117, 133. 
39. See, e.g., R. AsHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLmcs & LocKE'S Two Treatises of 
Government 181-227 (1986); Fellman, The European Background ofEarly American Ideas 
Concerning Property, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 497, 502-06 (1940). 
40. Some commentators have claimed that Locke's concept of property, as well as 
the Liberal tradition as a whole, embodies a radical-conservative tension that can be traced 
to seventeenth century political conflicts that occurred while Liberal ideology was being 
formed. See R. ASHCRAFT, supra note 39, at 183-85. The implications of Ashcraft's argu­
ment suggest that many of Locke's concepts might embody several different meanings, and 
this might also apply to property. Different Founders appropriated and interpreted the 
word property in several different ways, suggesting that property could be described as an 
"essentially contested concept." Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCE. OF AR­
ISTOTELIAN Soc'y 167 (1956). 
Additionally, Dworetz's exegesis of Locke suggested that Locke's view of property 
was tied to liberty, consent, and limited government, the notion of property that the Ameri­
can Revolutionaries noted. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 70-74. 
41. C. BECKER, supra note 29, at 27-42; P. LARKIN, supra note 19, at 137-45; F. 
McDONALD, supra note 7, at 10-15. 
42. II J. LOCKE, supra note 3, ~ 88; see also J. MADISON, supra note 18, at 102 
(stating that "[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort."). 
43. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of "Property" in Seventeenth-Century Eng­
land, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 93-95 (1980). 
44. Locke's theory of property was an "in rem" or thing theory of ownership as 
opposed to a "relational" theory of ownership. 
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became personal property. 45 
In Locke's view, property included more than the possessions of 
individuals. Property referred to one's "Life, Liberty, and Estate."46 
"Property" was a general political term referring to all the personal 
and political rights of individuals with ownership of one's body and 
talents premised upon the natural freedom of individuals.47 These 
comments of Locke, along with the placing of property in a state of 
nature, indicate that property was meant to affirm the natural political 
rights and liberties of individuals against the state,48 and not necessar­
. ily to only be a tool of economic development.49 These natural rights 
are not lost to the state, but instead "[t]he supreme power cannot take 
from any man part of his property without his own consent; for the 
preservation of property being the end of government and that for 
which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that 
the people should have property."50 
Thus, when Locke argued that the protection of property is the 
end or goal of government, or that each individual should have prop­
erty, he argued that government should protect the political liberties 
of individuals. It is a misreading of Locke to suppose that his theory 
of property is essentially a defense of capitalist accumulation, although 
it may be incidentally SO.51 It is also wrong to assume that the protec­
tion of property means an absolute ban upon government interference 
with the material possessions of its citizens. Property is to be pro­
tected because it is associated with the political liberties of individuals, 
and is important to individual self-expression, identity, and personal­
ity.52 Many colonial American readings of Locke's theory of property 
45. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 11 27. 
46. Id. 11 123. 
47. lid. 11 67; II id. 11 5. 
48. R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 198 (1985). 
Smith argued that the core meaning of Lockean-Liberalism, and presumably property, is to 
"promote reflective self-direction, or rational liberty." Id. at 198-201. 
49. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETfS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 126 (1975). Nelson argued 
that legal recognition of property rights expanded after the American Revolution. While 
indicating that the reasons for this expansion are unclear, Nelson speculated that 
"[p]erhaps the extension of property doctrine may best be explained by a tendency of the 
postrevolutionary generation to equate the protection of property with the preservation of 
liberty." [d. 
50. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 11 138. 
51. Macpherson contended that Locke's views were a defense of capitalism. C. 
MACPHERSON, supra note 36, at 220-21. For a response to Macpherson's bourgeois inter­
pretation of Locke, see R. AsHCRAFT, supra note 39, at 185. 
52. II J. LocKE, supra note 3, 1111 28-31; J. TULLY, supra note 36, at llO-ll, 121, 
131, 143; Fellman, supra note 39, at 505; Hamilton, supra note 35, at 864, 868. 
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noted this connection between personal political liberty and property 
ownership. These interpretations agreed with Locke that property 
rights deserved a somewhat absolute protection against government 
regulation.53 
B. James Harrington and Republicanism 
J.G.A. Pocock argued in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition that a second 
description of property is found in the neoclassical Republican tradi­
tion that influenced American political thought. 54 This Republican 
tradition can be traced back to the classical writings of Aristotle, the 
Romans, Machiavelli, and sixteenth century humanists in Florence, 
Italy.55 This school's primary influence on colonial America was 
James Harrington's utopian treatise, The Commonwealth of Oceana. 
According to Pocock, the Atlantic Republic tradition (Republi­
canism) is characterized bya political philosophy 'emphasizing the 
"vita activa" (active life) of political engagement as opposed to the 
contemplative and withdrawn life of the Christian world. 56 Thus, the 
Republican tradition stressed the importance of a politically engaged 
citizenry active in a small homogeneous community. It was a political 
philosophy committed to popular government, political liberty, and a 
relatively equal distribution of wealth or property ownership within a 
political community. 57 The reason for the preoccupation with this lat­
ter point was that Republican writers were fearful of private avarice 
and interest corrupting the political community. 58 Pocock proposed 
that avarice upset the public virtues necessary for the maintenance of a 
republican form of government, and once this type of government was 
infected by corruption, its degeneration into tyranny was inevitable. 59 
Perhaps the most obvious sign of corruption in a republic was the 
unequal distribution of wealth or property. If property were maldis­
tributed, according to Pocock, Republicans feared that some individu­
als or groups (factions as they would later be called by James 
53. S. DWORETZ, supra note 10, at 71-74; Aylmer, supra note 43, at 95-97. The list 
of colonial leaders influenced by the political views of Locke includes Madison, Jefferson, 
Hamilton, Samuel Adams, John Adams and John Tyler. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-30 (1967); C. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLIT­
ICAL THEORIES, NEW YORK 62 (1926); V. PARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 189, 237. 
54. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at viii. 
55. Id. at vii, 6-15. 
56. Id. at 49-56. 
57. Id. at 203-07. 
58. Id. at 133-35. 
59. Id. at 208-09. 
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Madison) would gain too much political power and upset popular gov­
ernment and individual liberty. 60 One "solution" to preventing cor­
ruption and encouraging political "regeneration" would be to 
maintain a relatively equal distribution of property ownership in the 
political community. 61 
James Harrington's The Commonwealth ofOceana is indebted to 
and part of th~. Florentine traditiun that linked the maintenance of 
Republican government, liberty, and popular government to the distri­
bution of property within a community.62 Harrington described the 
political institutions necessary to maintain a republican form of gov­
ernment. In Oceana, he argued for the need to achieve a balance of 
power in a commonwealth between the king, the nobility, and the peo­
ple if tyranny was to be avoided and a limited republican form of gov­
ernment was to be sustained.63 Crucial to that balance of power, or the 
"doctrine of balance" in Harrington's words, was the equal distribu­
tion of property among the above three groupS.64 Grariting anyone 
group, such as the king, a disproportionate amount of control over 
property would give that group excessive power in the republic.65 
Harrington saw the doctrine of balance as necessary to limit the 
Crown's power.66 The doctrine of balance was rooted in the tradi­
tional neoclassical fear of excessive or maldistributions of wealth as a 
sign of an unhealthy commonwealth.67 A free republic could only be 
maintained if excessive concentrations of wealth in the possession of 
few could be avoided.68 Dispersed and relatively equal ownership of 
property was crucial to limiting political power and promoting 
freedom.69 
Harrington, perhaps over-simplistically, adopted this Republican 
view of property and saw a correlation between personal property and 
political power. While Harrington and Locke agreed that property 
was important to independence and status in society, Harrington did 
not share Locke's view that the goal of society was to protect property, 
or that the state could not regulate it. 70 Harrington also did not be­
60. Id. at 209. 
61. Id. at 104-20. 
62. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 6-16. 
63. [d. at 167, 405. 
64. [d. 
65. Id. at 164. 
66. Fellman, supra note 39, at 507-09. 
67. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 164; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 209. 
68. Fellman, supra note 39, at 509-10. 
69. Id. 
70. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 137-38, 145. 
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lieve that existing property distributions were natura!.'l Property 
rules were conventional and distributions could be altered or regulated 
to promote Republican forms of government. Harrington would pro­
tect individual liberty not by protecting the natural property rights of 
individuals, but by redistributing property to ensure a Republican and 
limited form of government.72 
According to Pocock, Harrington's doctrine of balance was inter­
preted by his followers as an argument against executive patronage 
and power.73 Therefore, it became an important ideological tool of 
opposition for the American colonials against King George III,74 and 
a clear influence upon the early formulation of American politics such 
that the American Founding can be linked to the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition.75 The influence of James Harrington, the principal Euro­
pean source of colonial Republican thought, can best be seen in the 
writings of the Anti-Federalists who articulated the importance of 
property divisions in preserving state Republican governments.76 
For example, Samuel Bryan, in his Letters of Centinel, closely 
followed Harrington's sentiments when he argued that a "republican, 
or free government, can only exist where the body of the people are 
virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided."77 Addition­
ally, John Adams, a Federalist, was also influenced by Harrington in 
his advocacy of the position that the distribution of political power in 
society flows from the distribution of property.78 Even Thomas J effer­
son's "wards system," or the political reorganization of Virginia coun­
ties into hundreds of equally-sized school districts,79 along with the 
broad distribution of property ownership, was a recognition of the re­
71. Id. at 405. 
72. Id.; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 386-90. 
73. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 143-45; POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 416-20. 
74. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 144. 
75. POCOCK I, supra note 2, at 506-07. In opposition to this notion, Thomas Pan­
gle's The Spirit 0/Modern Republicanism questioned how direct and coherent the Republi­
can tradition was in America. Pangle argued that the influence of the Republican tradition 
was felt indirectly because it was read and interpreted by the Founders through the work of 
Locke. T. PANGLE, supra note 27, at 28-39. 
76. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 70-75. 
77. Bryan, Letter 0/ Centinel, I, in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SE­
LECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 25, at 141. These letters were published to urge against 
the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and to oppose the adoption of the then 
proposed United States Constitution. Introduction to ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDER­
ALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 25, at 1-5. 
78. McKeon, supra note 22, at 354-57. 
79. T. JEFFERSON, A Bill/or the More General Diffusion 0/Knowledge, in WRmNGS 
367-68 (1984); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly (Jan. 27, 1800), re­
printed in WRITINGS, supra, at 1073. 
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publican link between property, independence, and limited 
government.80 
Harrington's views also surfaced in James Madison's Federalist 
No. 10, where property distributions were described as the chief cause 
of factionalism in society.81 Nevertheless, the RepUblican solution of 
equalizing property so as to remove sources of factionalism was re­
jected. James Madison, while noting how important property distri­
butions were to popular government, created political mechanisms, 
such as checks and balances and separation of powers, to render these 
distributions politically less significant.82 In Madison's view, inequali­
ties in property, as rooted in the differences in human talents and fac­
ulties, would be rendered politically unimportant if appropriate checks 
were instituted to neutralize some property interests by others. 83 
Somewhat conversely, Gordon Wood argued in The Creation of the 
American Republic: 1776-1787 that this transformation of the tradi­
tional Republican concept of property in the Federalist Papers and the 
United States Constitution represented the "end of classical politics," 
because it minimized the need to eliminate avarice and vice from the 
political system and instead sought mechanisms to make private inter­
est and property divisions serve the public good. 84 
C. Blackstone and the Conventional Nature ofProperty 
While the influence of Locke and Harrington upon early Ameri­
can political thought are often noted, other commentators have sug­
gested that Sir William Blackstone's views on property have been 
overlooked as an important influence on eighteenth century perspec­
tives on property and early American property law.8s In an article 
relating to both the influence of David Hume and Blackstone on com­
mon law notions of property, Frederick Whelan suggested that Black­
stone's view of property represented "the 'official' view of property in 
80. POCOCK III, supra note 5, at 150-51 (noting Harrington's influence upon Jeffer­
son and Noah Webster); H. SMITH, HARRINGTON AND HIS OcEANA: A STUDY OF A 17TH 
CENTURY UTOPIA AND ITS INFLUENCE IN AMERICA 152 (1914) (discussing Harrington's 
influence in America). 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (1. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Fellman, supra 
note 39, at 509-16. 
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 56-57; THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 
337-38 (1. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 338-41 (J. Madison) 
(1. Cooke ed. 1961). 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 81, at 56-57. 
84. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 606-19. 
85. F. McDoNALD, supra note 7, at II, 20, 188; Whelan, supra note 12, at 101-04, 
114-27. 
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the classical liberal era."86 Blackstone's views were generally more 
legalistic and conventional than either Locke's or Harrington's. De­
spite this general view, there were instances in the Commentaries on 
the Laws of England where -Blackstone mirrored the views of Locke. 
For example, in volume two of the Commentaries, Blackstone stated: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, 
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or 
that sole and despotic dominion which one man clailns and exer­
cises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe. 87 
In this passage, Blackstone described property as an "absolute 
right."88 Blackstone proposed that the protection of this right, as well 
as the protection of other absolute rights such as security and liberty, 
is the "principle aim of society."89 
Despite passages suggesting that Blackstone was simply echoing 
Locke, there are numerous other instances where Blackstone differed 
with Locke and as suggested by Whelan,9O agreed with David Hume, 
who denied that property existed in a state of nature91 and instead 
claimed that property rights are "not natural but moral."92 For in­
stance, Blackstone argued that property was not a natural right but a 
conventional institution created by law, habit, or the passage oftime.93 
In volume· one of his Commentaries, Blackstone agreed with Locke 
that the protection of property is important and necessary for free­
dom. However, Blackstone also indicated that property is not natural 
but acquired by usurpation and other means.94 Blackstone argued 
that it is the law and not natural right that determines what can be 
owned and the prerogatives associated with the ownership of 
property.95 
86. Whelan, supra note 12, at 115. 
87. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 2. Whelan suggested that this quotation, 
read in the overall context of the Commentaries, does not reflect Blackstone's agreement 
with Locke that property is a "mere positive right." Whelan, supra note 12, at 11.9. 
Rather, Whelan suggested that the ,. 'right of property' is a form of shorthand for a com­
plex set of different rights." [d. at 119. 
88. Whelan, supra note 12, at 118; see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 134 
("The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property . . . . "). 
89. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 120. 
90. Whelan, supra note 12, at 120-21, 124-27. 
91. D. HUME, On the Origin ofJustice and Property, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLIT­
ICAL PHILOSOPHY 60 (H. Aiken ed. 1948). 
92. [d. 
93. Whelan, supra note 12, at 102-03. 
94. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 134. 
95. [d. 
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In the first volume of the Commentaries, Blackstone described 
property as an absolute right of an Englishman,96 yet this right was 
tempered by "the laws of the land" and subject to numerous legal re­
strictions as described in the second volume.97 In the second volume, 
Blackstone described property ownership as an absolute dominion, 
noting that the legal ownership of property had no foundation in na­
ture or natural law and that rules prescribing its use and transfer were 
determined by society.98 Although Blackstone stated that the protec­
tion of property was the principle aim of society, he did not agree with 
Locke that the purpose or origin of society resided in the protection of 
property rights. In the Introduction to volume one of the Commenta­
ries, Blackstone claimed that "[t]he only true and natural foundations 
of [s]ociety are the wants and the fears of individuals."99 
These two passages could be said to represent contradictory views 
on property, and biographers and analyses of Blackstone's writings 
have sought to reconcile this contradiction. loo For example, commen­
tators have suggested that Blackstone was not a consistent political 
theorist but was more concerned with pulling together the existing 
contradictory or inconsistent laws of England. 101 This suggests that 
Blackstone either had little concern or did not see his different writ­
ings on property as inconsistent, but instead as reflective of legal prac­
tice at that time in England. Another suggestion, offered by Whelan, 
was that Blackstone was not inconsistent when it came to his discus­
sion of property. Property rights were absolute for Blackstone, but 
only absolute within the lines prescribed by society and law.102 More­
over, while first occupation may be the original reason why one has 
acquired use of property, continued or legal occupation rests upon 
rules of a civil society. In short, an individual's absolute right to prop­
erty is tempered by the rights of others or by the public good. 103 
Despite some inconsistencies in describing property rights, Black­
stone greatly influenced American legal history.l04 Blackstone's biog­
raphers claim that his influence was greater in America than in 
England and that numerous editions of the Commentaries were 
96. Id. 
97. 2 id. at 373-83. 
98. Id. at 373-74. 
99. 1 id. at 47. 
100. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 12, at 118-20. 
101. For a review of criticisms of the Commentaries, see D. LocKMILLER, supra 
note 12, at 146-48, 162-68; L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 273-80. 
102. Whelan, supra note 12, at 119-20. 
103. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 374. 
104. F. McDONALD, supra note 7, at 7. 
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shipped to or printed in the colonies. lOS For example, Blackstone's 
views on the rights of Englishmen influenced the writing of the Decla­
ration of Independence as sixteen of its signers were known to have 
purchased and read the Commentaries. l06 At the Constitutional Con­
vention, the Founders discussed terms such as "ex post facto laws" 
and "due process" in the way that Blackstone had described these 
legal concepts. 107 But most importantly, some argue that it was 
Blackstone's influence that was especially important in early American 
legal history because judges and lawyers (in addition to many of the 
Founders such as Jefferson, Hamilton, and Adams) turned to him for 
reference as they sought to apply English property law to new Ameri­
can social and economic conditions. lOS Jurists such as Marshall, Kent, 
and Story turned to Blackstone as the only source and commentary on 
the common law and incorporated many of his views into their 
"Americanization" of English rules. 
In sum, at least three traditions can be considered important in 
early American legal and political thought on property. Locke's view 
linked property to the natural political liberties and personality of in­
dividuals. 109 Harrington linked property to limited and Republican 
forms of government,110 while Blackstone's views emphasized the 
changing legal nature of property and how the law could alter prop­
erty relations. 1 1 1 Those who claim that American Founding values 
were exclusively Lockean or Republican ignore the fact that there is 
no single or uniquely and easily identifiable influence at the level of 
political rhetoric because all of these languages were used by early 
Americans. 112 No one view predominated colonial American politics. 
There is, then, a hybrid of several languages in the "great national 
discussion" forming a distinctly American view of property. 113 Yet, if 
105. D. LOCKMILLER, supra note 12, at 169-70; L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 320­
21. 
106. L. WARDEN, supra note 12, at 323. 
107. D. LocKMILLER, supra note 12, at 174. 
108. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 11 
(1977); see Scheiber, The Road to Munn· Eminent Domain and the Concept ofPublic Pur­
pose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329, 359-60 (D. Fleming & B. 
Bailyn eds. 1971). 
109. See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 56-84 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text. 
112. Horwitz, supra note 8, at 64. 
113. Kramnick discussed how the language of our Constitution embodies several dif­
ferent languages, often at odds, and usually difficult to separate or discern from one an­
other, thus inviting a diversity of interpretations. Kramnick, supra note 11, at 4; see also 
M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 13 (making a parallel claim). 
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there was any consensus among the Framers, it resided in the agree­
ment that property was important to individual political liberty.114 
Despite these claims about property rights, the important question is 
how this rhetoric of property rights was translated into political-insti­
tutional mechanisms. In particular, which, if any, political tradition 
actually influenced the reality and practice of property rights in Amer­
ican politics and law? The second part of this article addresses this 
question. 
II. THE TRANSFORMATION AND CONTRADICTIONS 

OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 

While influencing colonial and constitutional debate, the Liberal, 
Republican, and legal (Blackstone'S) theories on property may have 
influenced other aspects of American legal history. I IS Examples in­
clude later court decisions and political debates on property rights and 
eminent domain. Yet despite the importance attached to property 
rights in Liberal and Republican debates in 1787, these rights were not 
treated as inviolable, and it appears that other political languages, 
such as the Blackstone legal tradition mentioned above, more clearly 
explained how property rights were treated in early American politics 
and law. 
In his examination of the different political traditions that influ­
enced colonial America, Issac Kramnick noted that the language of 
"state-centered theories of power and sovereignty" was important in 
early constitutional debate and that the reality of creating a govern­
ment and nation tempered the excesses of political rhetoric articulated 
during the Founding era. 116 For example, according to Alexander 
Hamilton, the Constitution was only written to protect property.ll7 
Institutional necessity did give property some special protections, but 
this necessity did not create a constitutional right to property or pre­
clude all state regulation of property rights as might have been sug­
114. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLmCAL TRADmON AND THE MEN 
WHO MADE IT 10-12 (1948). 
115. See, e.g., V. PARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 305. Madison's notes on the Con­
stitutional Convention indicated numerous discussions of property in the drafting of the 
new Constitution. Property qualifications for voting and election to office were discussed. 
Madison linked the protection of property and private rights together as the "essential 
object of the laws." P. LARKIN, supra note 19, at 156-58; see also Horwitz, supra note 8, at 
68 (noting Lockean-Liberal influences in the fifth amendment). 
116. Kramnick, supra note 11, at 4, 23-27. 
117. THE FEDERALIST No.1, at 3-7 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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gested by Liberal ideology. liS Instead, the Founders, as political 
realists, lawyers, and followers of Blackstone and the British legal tra­
dition, realized that there may be instances when property rights may 
have to be limited for public necessity. 
Even if the Constitution did follow Locke's view and treat prop­
erty as a natural and absolute barrier against legislative power, there is 
evidence that within fifty years after 1787, the political rhetoric of 
property as an absolute political right was abandoned in favor of an 
economic-utilitarian theory of property rights which was clearly not 
Lockean or Republican; at least not Lockean or Republican as the 
Founders understood these traditions. 119 In The Transformation of 
American Law, Morton Horwitz argued that in early America there 
existed a natural or antidevelopmental view of property rights. 120 This 
agrarian and "natural" view of property resembled the teachings of 
Locke, and stressed the absolute right of individuals over their prop­
erty to the exclusion of others. Such a view implied that other parties 
were precluded from interfering with another's property and would be 
expected to pay damages for trespass or denial of use. 121 
A second view of property also surfaced in early American law. 
The focus of this view was a more commercial or developmental the­
ory of property which made it subject to regulation for the economic 
welfare of the community.122 
The emergence of a developmental theory of property had several 
important consequences. At one level, the theory questioned any 
myth about the absolute rights individuals had over property, and 
made the ownership of property subject to greater legislative regula­
tion than before. At another level, the commercial focus denied that 
property rights were natural or that they were as closely tied to indi­
vidual political liberty as Locke's politics had assumed. 
The developmental theory of property also pitted the economic 
interests of landed property owners against the rising commercial class 
who sought to limit the rights of the property owners in order to fur­
ther economic development. 123 Horwitz argued that these rival inter­
118. Sager, Property Rights and the Constitution, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, 
supra note 12, at 376. 
119. Dworetz claimed that by this time in history, colonial practice had rejected the 
belief that political property rights were immune from regulation. S. DWORETZ, supra 
note 10, at 70-71. 
120. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 32. 
121. Id. at 32-33. 
122. Id. at 33-34; M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 83. 
123. This notion further suggests that different groups or interests in society had 
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ests were adjudicated by the state courts throughout this country and 
that by 1860, the conflict was resolved in favor of the developmental 
theory of rightS.124 The resolution, which Horwitz described as the 
transformation of American law,125 resulted in the emergence of an 
instrumental and economic utilitarian depiction of property. This 
characterization viewed property rights not as natural or "political" 
(as suggested by Liberal rhetoric),126 but as conventional and subject 
to regulation and limitation (as suggested by Republican thought) to 
promote the economic development of society and the class interests of 
a rising entrepreneurial class. 127 This transformation of property law 
was aided in part by changes in eminent domain which eroded tradi­
tional property rights and made them subject to regulation for the 
common good. 128 
Changes in American property law occurred within the first 50 
years after 1787 as judges adapted British property law, as understood 
through Blackstone, to American social-economic conditions.!29 In 
the absence of a colonial American law on property, judges changed 
English property law to conform to the new United States Constitu­
tion. As Morton Horwitz,!30 James Hurst,!3! and G. Edward 
White132 have noted in their respective histories of early American 
law, state and federal court judges were important in adapting the 
English property law, which was suited to a nation with limited land 
tied to feudal privileges, to a large and expanding nation with ample 
land. The task of the early American judge was to rewrite property 
law to fit the new American needs of commercial development. Thus, 
although the same language of property was used in the United States 
as in England, the empirical context and referents had changed such 
that the meaning and use of the term "property" in America had to be 
different ideas about what property was or which type of property rights deserved 
protection. 
124. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 1-31. 
125. Id. at 1-30. 
126. "Political" is used here in the sense that property ownership was justified as an 
important political tool to limit governmental power. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 
128. See infra notes 176-226 and accompanying text. 
129. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 360. 
130. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 9-12. 
131. See J. HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE­
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 90 (1956). 
132. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmON: PROFILES OF LEADING 
AMERICAN JUDGES 35-37 (1988). 
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different than it was in England. 133 The empirical context or referent 
of property in early nineteenth century America was different even 
from 1776-1787 America. 
There are many criticisms of Horwitz's transformation thesis. 
Some critics questioned the class conflict theory implicit in his argu­
ments, while others questioned the evidence tying state judges to the 
interests of a rising commercial class. 134 However, legal scholars do 
not disagree regarding the claim that property law changed tremen­
dously in the early nineteenth century. Property law did lose much of 
its political and natural rights character and became viewed almost 
exclusively as an economic commodity that could be regulated for the 
public welfare. 13S The great transformation of property law came as a 
shift from a political right important to liberty, to an economic good 
that could be regulated for economic reasons.136 Legal commentators 
on property law agree that this change occurred, and eminent domain 
and state judges were important in articulating that change. 137 
Much of the political fiction or myth that property rights were 
absolute appears to have been abandoned in the law soon after 1787, 
suggesting that on the institutional level Liberal rhetoric had minimal 
influence, or that the Locke that had emerged was the "bourgeois" 
Locke that C.B. Macpherson138 and others had described.139 Yet 
throughout the nineteenth century, American law continued to be 
133. For a discussion of the role of context and usage as influencing the meaning of 
concepts, see L. WfITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958). 
134. Hurst, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175-79 (1977) (reviewing M. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977»; Reid; Book 
Review, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1307, 1310-12 (1977) (reviewing M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFOR­
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977». 
135. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 31-62. 
136. Id. 
137. White and Hurst agreed with Horwitz on the emerging utilitarian and economic 
character of American property law in the early nineteenth century. G. WHITE, supra note 
132, at 35-37; J. HURST, supra note 131, at 3-8. Friedman argued that the transformation 
of American property law was occurring even before the Revolution. L. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202 (1973). Friedman noted his agreement with Horwitz on 
the economic transformation of American law as a movement from a static to dynamic 
theory of property. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 235-36 (2d ed. 1985). 
The cause of that transformation was not discussed by Friedman. 
138. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
139. Lockean premises dominated much of the political rhetoric of property from 
1776-1790 while regulation of property was more consistent with Republican or Black­
stone's legalistic values. However, later in the nineteenth century, Lockean ideology did 
become more important in American law, especially with the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment and the articulation of liberty of contract and substantive due process con­
cepts. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background o/the Law 0/ Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. 
REV. 67, 81-83 (1931). 
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plagued by the "contradiction" that the right to property was absolute 
in some respects and not in others. 14O This contradiction suggests that 
while Liberal or Republican rhetoric may have been given rhetorical 
lip service, a legal tradition stemming from Blackstone may have been 
more important in how the judiciary and commentators of the time 
thought about and acted in regard to property. Even though there is 
evidence that property had been transformed during the early nine­
teenth century, there is also evidence that even during the Founding 
era, there was a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of property 
rights which led to the above transformation. 
III. EMINENT DOMAIN IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW 
A. Early Constitutional History and the Fifth Amendment 
While property rights in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries may have been described in Lockean or Republican terms, 
early recognition of eminent domain among other forms of American 
property regulation meant that property rights were not absolute and 
were subject to numerous legislative controls.141 For example, while 
Jefferson felt that property was an absolute right, he advocated that 
the state should regulate it to abolish primogeniture and promote agri­
cultural production. 142 In his role as Secretary of Treasury, Hamilton 
accepted some regulation of property as essential to the promotion of 
commerce. 143 In addition, numerous jurists and advocates of Republi­
canism recognized the need to regulate property to promote individual 
freedom.l44 Extensive demand and actual colonial regulation of prop­
erty suggests that legal reality conflicted with the political rhetoric of 
absolute property rights. 
Eminent domain is the sovereign right or power to take private 
property for public use. 14S William Stoebuck, in his analysis of the 
history of eminent domain, argued that eminent domain can be traced 
140. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 332. 
141. F. McDONALD, supra note 7, at 10-55 (discussing the legislative limitations on 
property rights including regulation of the acquisition and use of property and contracts, 
regulation of monopolies, and the construction of debt law). There were numerous restric­
tions on property because property was seen to serve community ethical or economic needs 
first, and individual convenience second. W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 51-53. 
142. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 130 (1974); M. 
LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 87-89, 93. 
143. J. CooKE, supra note 20, at 73-84. 
144. J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 61-83, 
194-97 (1971). 
145. 1 J. SACKMAN & R. V AN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d 
ed. 1990). 
176 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:155 
to the Romans, but the origin of what is considered modem eminent 
domain can be found in English feudal law and the natural law tradi­
tion. l46 Stoebuck claimed that eminent domain originated in medieval 
feudal law granting the king supreme power or eminent domain over 
all land in the kingdom. 147 Similarly, in·his historical analysis of emi­
nent domain, J.A.C. Grant traced the origin of the concept to natural 
law arguments giving the state a natural right to control land to secure 
"higher" purposes. 148 
Whatever the origin, Stoebuck and Lenhoff agree that eminent 
domain came to be seen as an essential attribute of sovereignty which 
could not be alienated. By the time the United States Constitution and 
the fifth amendment were written, the law recognized that eminent 
domain was an inherent power of government (as evidenced by colo­
nial use) and not in need of specification. 149 
The concept of eminent domain was mentioned by Locke and 
Blackstone, among other seventeenth and eighteenth century political 
writers. ISO Locke, while defending an absolute right to property as a 
political protection against the king, recognized the right of the gov­
ernment to take property to the extent that either the owner or his 
representative consented. lSI However, Locke did not indicate com­
pensation was due when property was taken. William Stoebuck con­
tended that a compensation requirement was implicit in Locke's 
discussion of taxation. 1S2 Perhaps this is true, yet Stoebuck's own dis­
cussion suggested that Parliament and general practice did distinguish 
eminent domain, or expropriation, from taxation,IS3 and thus it is not 
clear that the restrictions on one applied to the other. Consent was 
required for both, but compensation for taxation was certainly not re­
quired and it is uncertain if Locke had thought about applying a com­
pensation requirement to expropriation. 
In his analysis of the just compensation doctrine in early Ameri­
can law, Errol Meidinger argued that the first recorded uses of emi­
146. Stoebuck, A General Theory 0/ Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 
(1972); see also Lenhoff, Development 0/ the Concept 0/ Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 596, 596-98 (1942). 
147. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 562-64. 
148. Grant, supra note 139, at 67-85. 
149. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) (eminent domain affirmed as an in­
herent and implied power of states and federal government). 
150. See Lenhoff, supra note 146, at 601-03 (arguing that the origin of the "enforced 
sale concept" is in Montesquieu, Pufendorf, and Blackstone). 
151. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 567. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 566-67. 
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nent domain in America can be traced to a 1639 Massachusetts statute 
authorizing the taking of land to build roads. This statute did not 
allow houses, gardens, or orchards to be destroyed. The only compen­
sation that would be given to the owner would be for damage to these 
items. Land acquisition itself did not merit compensation. ls4 In New 
York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, private property could also 
be taken without compensation. ISS Eminent domain was widely used 
to acquire land in colonial America. However, as Meidinger,IS6 Hor­
witz,ls7 Nelson,lss Stoebuck,ls9 and other commentatorsl60 have 
agreed, neither the principle of just compensation nor a "public use" 
limit on acquisition was stipulated in colonial charters or constitu­
tions. Horwitz noted that compensation did not become the rule in 
the states until the mid-nineteenth century,161 and it was not until 
1897 that the Supreme Court required states to compensate for prop­
erty acquisition,162 Similarly, public use stipulations only slowly 
emerged after the Revolution and in the nineteenth century.163 
By 1787, eminent domain was a recognized element of sover­
eignty and used by the states to acquire property for projects such as 
roads, dams, and schools. However, just compensation was not a 
widely accepted pr!lctice despite the fact that Blackstone and parlia­
mentary practice endorsed this concept. A review of the history of the 
fifth amendment and colonial political thought illustrates the reason 
for this apparent contradiction between British and American 
practice. 
In an article addressing the just compensation clause of the fifth 
amendment, one commentator claimed that this contradiction disap­
peared when the fifth amendment is viewed as a part of the ideological 
shift from Republicanism to Liberalism. l64 The commentator claimed 
that colonial America was significantly influenced by a Republican 
ideology that had faith in the public legislature to secure the public 
154. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" 0/ Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 
ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1980). 
155. Comment, The Origins and Original Significance 0/ the Just Compensation 
Clause o/the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,695 n.6 (1985). 
156. Meidinger, supra note 154, at 13-14. 
157. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63. 
158. W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 130. 
159. Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 591-92. 
160. Comment, supra note 155, at 695 n.6. 
161. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63-70. 
162. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
163. See infra notes 176-226 and accompanying text. 
164. Comment, supra note 155, at 694. 
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good. 16S Republicans also believed that excessive property ownership 
was a sign of a corrupt polity and counterproductive to republican 
government. l66 A legislature thus had the right to redistribute prop­
erty to secure both the public good and a republican government. A 
compensation requirement would make this property redistribution 
costly and difficult.167 
According to one commentator, colonial constitutions reflected 
this view in that they lacked just compensation statutes, and instead 
gave legislatures broad discretion to determine how land may be best 
used. Just compensation clauses finally emerged in the 1777 Vermont 
and 1780 Massachusetts constitutions, and in the 1787 Northwest Or­
dinance. 168 This commentator claimed that these documents repre­
sented early shifts from Republican to liberal ideology, which stressed 
the growing importance of individual property rights. 169 This transi­
tion from Republicanism to Liberalism is reflected in the drafting of 
the new United States Constitution and emerged more clearly in the 
first Congress and with the passage of the fifth amendment. 
Madison introduced the fifth amendment in Congress on June 8, 
1789. 170 The amendment as proposed by Madison stated: 
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to 
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense; nor 
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be 
obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for 
public use, without a just compensation. l71 
No debate on the takings clause was ever recorded, although there 
were debates on other sections of the amendment.172 Thus, no re­
corded debate on this issue ever took place,173 although prior to the 
passage of the Bill of Rights the question of just compensation was 
165. Id. at 694-95. 
166. Id. at 699-700. 
167. Id. at 698. 
168. Id. at 701. 
169. Id. at 694-95. 
170. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Technically, Madison was not 
introducing the fifth amendment, but was suggesting that this clause be added in Article I, 
section 9 between clauses three and four.). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 753. 
173. Actually, Madison's National Gazette, March 29, 1792, piece does refer to the 
taking of property for a public use, but the discussion gives little clarification of the mean­
ing of the fifth amendment except to show that Madison, while recognizing that property is 
important in society, also allowed it to be taken for social purposes. J. MADISON, supra 
note 18, at 101-03. 
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certainly not settled. 174 
The fifth amendment had several important characteristics not 
readily apparent on the face of the provision. First, the amendment 
applied only to the national government and not to the states. Both 
Anti-Federalists wishing to limit the national government, and liber­
als, such as Madison, interested in protecting property, supported the' 
just compensation clause as a limitation on national power .. The pas­
sage of the amendment settled the question that eminent domain was 
an inherent power of sovereignty and that there was no question that 
the national government had this power. Colonial Americans appear 
to have been more worried about just compensation and the national 
government than uncompensated takings by the states. After the pas­
sage of the fifth amendment, the states were still free to take property 
as they had done in pre-amendment colonial times. 175 
B. Judicial Applications and the Mills Acts 
There was very little litigation at the federal level concerning emi­
nent domain and the takings clause of the fifth amendment until after 
the Civil War,l16 Early American litigation on eminent domain oc­
curred in state courts where legal compensation requirements were 
minimal and the definition of a taking was narrowly construed to be 
an actual physical taking of property.177 The Mills Acts are a good 
example of this nineteenth century eminent domain property 
litigation. 178 
In many states, for example, Massachusetts, the construction of 
grain mills required the building of dams that resulted in the flooding 
of adjacent lands and the disturbing of riparian rights,l19 The Mills 
Acts permitted this dam construction and flooding but the Acts and 
many state court judges did not stipulate compensation. 180 Property 
was damaged, but no legal injury resulted. Even though an individual 
174. See supra notes 141-64 and accompanying text. 
175. This may suggest that Lockean influences were more significant on the national 
than on the state level where republican concerns were stronger. 
176. The federal courts did not recognize the federal power of eminent domain until 
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1 876}. The fifth amendment just compensation re­
quirement was not applied to the states until 1897 in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail­
road v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). In Barron v. The Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the 
Court and explicitly rejected the application of the fifth amendment and the Bill of Rights 
to the individual states. 
177. Comment, supra note ISS, at 708. 
178. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 47-53. 
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180. [d. at 49-53; G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 55-61. 
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property owner lost land to flooding, no legal taking occurred because 
the owner did not lose complete use of the property. The lost property 
was considered a legitimate sacrifice for the public good. 
The Mills Acts were important in the early history of eminent 
domain for several reasons. The Acts set a precedent for the transfer 
of eminent domain to private individuals so long as the actions of the 
private individuals served a public purpose. For example, creating a 
grain mill was deemed a valid public use. 181 The notable opinions of 
Massachusetts Justice Shaw on the Mills Acts upheld the transfer of 
eminent domain to private parties so long as a public use ensued. 182 
The Massachusetts cases paved the way for the subsequent transfer of 
eminent domain to other private concerns, such as the railroads, so 
long as a similar public use could be shown. 183 . 
Few colonial or early post-Revolution state constitutions had a 
public use stipulation for eminent domain. In their comprehensive 
analysis of eminent domain law in America, Julius Sackman and Rus­
sell Van Brunt claimed in Nichols on Eminent Domain that the taking 
of property for private use was common practice in colonial America, 
and that public use limitations were not even discussed when the first 
post-Revolution state constitutions were created.184 Although public 
use limits became popular around 1800, the meaning of public use was 
still a matter of some debate. 18s As Stoebuck and Philip Nichols indi­
cated in their respective studies of eminent domain, the Mills Acts 
made public use an important state justification for eminent domain, 
defining public use as "for the public benefit."186 The Mills Acts were 
thus important in influencing future understandings and limitations on 
eminent domain power. 
The judiciary broadly interpreted the term "public use" in con­
struing the Mills ActS. 187 This reading of public use granted legisla­
tures significant power to acquire property, often to the private benefit 
of individuals, so long as some public benefit could be claimed. A 
broad interpretation of public use competed with narrow construc­
181. Meidinger, supra note 154. at 16, notes that prior to the Mills Acts, only the 
Pennsylvania and Virginia constitutions had a public use stipulation. 
182. G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 58-60. 
183. See. e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837) (transfer of 
eminent domain to railroad upheld). 
184. 2A J. SACKMAN & R. VAN BRUNT, supra note 145, § 7.01. 
185. Nichols, The Meaning ofPublic Use in the Law ofEminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. 
REV. 615, 617-21 (1940). 
186. [d. at 619-21; Stoebuck, supra note 146, at 588-90. 
187. Nichols, supra note 185, at 619-21. 
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tions of the phrase that would later emerge. 188 The narrow definition 
of public use was determined to mean "used by the public" and did 
not give legislatures the power to take property as did a broad con­
struction of the term. 189 Specifically, the public acquisition and trans­
fer of property to private individuals for primarily private benefit 
would not be permitted even if there were an incidental public benefit. 
As stated earlier, early state eminent domain legislation in the 
Acts did not require compensation for land flooded when a dam was 
built. In general, the states did not require such compensation until 
the mid-1840s. As late as 1820, the majority of the states had not 
enacted compensation requirements for any taking of unimprOVed 
land. l90 However, during the first half of the nineteenth century a 
trend towards requiring compensation developed in the law. At the 
same time, a countertrend also emerged that limited the scope or ap­
plication of compensation.19l For example, Justice Shaw's opinions 
distinguished police power and regulation from takings. Shaw permit­
ted some uncompensated takings as necessary for the public good. 192 
Horwitz contended that a rule of limited compensation represented 
one means for the rising entrepreneurial class to redistribute property 
and power away from the traditional landed gentry.l93 Eminent do­
main without compensation became an important subsidy for ec0­
nomic development in that the property taken was put into more 
productive use by an emerging mercantile class. New economic inter­
ests, aligned with the judiciary in the state courts, supported an ex­
panding eminent domain power so long as compensation was narrowly 
defined. 194 
The litigation over the Mills Acts exemplifies how state law and 
188. Id. at 618-20. 
189. See id. for a discussion of the competing "broad" and "narrow" meanings of 
public use. 
190. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 62. 
191. Id. at 66. 
192. G. WHITE, supra note 132, at 35-63. White discussed the opinions of Justices 
Story, Kent, and Shaw and their differing approaches to property rights and eminent do­
main. Id. White argued that both Story and Kent were hostile to the emerging eminent 
domain power as a threat to private and traditional property rights. Id. In contrast, Shaw 
was instrumental in the transformation of property rights and views of property from a 
natural right to an instrumental or promotion of the public good theory of property. Id. 
Other commentators have also made this observation. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 
52-53, 261. As noted earlier, the activity of early American state court judges represents a 
significant amount of judicial activism in the face of legislatures not able or unwilling to 
change the existing laws on property. See infra notes 202-15 and accompanying text. 
193. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 63. 
194. Id. at 261-63. 
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the judiciary formulated much of the early American law on eminent 
domain and changed "ancient property rules to the promotion of ec0­
nomic development."l9s Until the 1850s, takings were construed nar­
rowly to mean actual title transfer or complete loss of land use.196 
Public use was construed to mean utilized by the public, and it justi­
fied the transfer of eminent domain to private concerns.197 Just com­
pensation was limited both in scope and the amount awarded. l98 
Eminent domain permitted the taking of property to further nor­
mal governmental functions, such as the construction of railroads and 
public buildings. It was also used to help mills and other economic 
projects.199 Additionally, eminent domain was used to further some 
social welfare functions, such as building hospitals and poor houses.200 
It was even used to further aesthetic purposes such as the construction 
of parks, the preservation of landscapes, and the maintenance of scenic 
views.20l 
While the use of eminent domain was well established in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, around the middle of the century the 
meaning of public use and just compensation changed in ways that 
again affected the status of property rights in many states. One early 
example of this change is reflected in a New York State court decision, 
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad CO.202 At issue in Blood­
good was a New York state law granting railroads the right to tres­
pass, take private land, and compensate the owner to build rai1lines. 
The statute did not contain a public use justification for this action. 
Chancellor Walworth and Senator Tracy opined that the public use 
doctrine applied to this type of taking and discussed the issue of what 
actually constituted a taking for the public use. 203 While addressing 
195. W. NELSON, supra note 49, at 159. 
196. Nichols, supra note 185, at 619-21. 
197. Id. at 618-19. 
198. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 72; Lenhoff, supra note 146, at 618; Mei­
dinger, supra note 154, at 27. Even sovereign immunity was passed on to private compa­
nies. See commentary cited supra. Private companies were exempt from suit for any 
damages caused to private property. At least one court ruled that even unanticipated dam­
ages were nonrecoverable. Van Schoick v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 20 N.J.L. 249 
(1843). The general principle of the day, damnum absque injuria, stressed that private 
damages were part of the price one paid for the betterment of social conditions. M. HOR­
WITZ, supra note 108, at 73. The individual property owner's compensation for sacrifice 
was the ability to share in the better conditions of society. 
199. Scheiber, supra note 108, at 399-400. 
200. [d. 
201. Meidinger, supra note 154, at 19. The latter uses did not emerge until the late 
nineteenth century. 
202. 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837). 
203. Id. at 29, 77. 
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the notions of public utility, public interest, and expediency, the court 
settled on a narrow definition of public use as "used by the public," 
rejecting earlier and broader notions of public use that equated the 
term with the public good.204 Thus, since the railroads were used by 
the pUblic, it was deemed appropriate for the state to allow the rail­
roads to take land. 
Bloodgood is significant because the court stated that the judiciary 
and not the legislature was declared to be the arbiter of the meaning of 
public use.205 Bloodgood represented one of the first state cases in 
which the judiciary failed to defer to a legislature to make public use 
decisions. Moreover, Bloodgood was one of the first cases that de­
clined to follow the broader notions of public use that previously had 
eroded the legal protections of property against legislative regulation 
and acquisition. 
In 1843, a New York court reaffirmed this new judicial role and 
trend towards limiting eminent domain. In Taylor v. Porter,206 the 
New York Supreme Court held that determinations of legitimate pub­
lic use should be judicial and not legislative. In Taylor, the court 
found unconstitutional a colonial law which allowed private roads to 
be built across the property of another person. 207 
Around the same time, Justice Shaw in Massachusetts made pub­
lic use determinations which narrowed the scope of earlier decisions. 
Prior decisions had given the state legislature broad authority to ac­
quire land for public uses such as railroads, turnpikes, bridges, and 
mills. 208 In Fiske v. Framingham Manufacturing CO.,209 Murdock v. 
Stickney,210 and Chase v. Sutton Manufacturing Co. ,211 Justice Shaw's 
opinions narrowed the eminent domain rulings of the Mills Acts, con­
struing the Acts as a species of riparian land law.212 Other states also 
overruled earlier eminent domain decisions on Mills Acts and imposed 
compensation and public use stipulations.213 The significance of these 
cases was to increase judicial protection for property rights by denying 
legislatures wide discretion to define public uses. State courts, led by 
204. Id. at 58-68. 
205. Id. at 70-72. 
206. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
207. ld. at 147-48, 153. 
208. See Fuller v. Dame, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 472 (1836); Boston Water Power Co. v. 
Boston & W.R.R., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 512 (1835). 
209. 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68 (1832). 
210. 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) (1851). 
211. 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 152 (1849). 
212. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 261. 
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Chancellor Walworth in Bloodgood, narrowed the definition of public 
use to mean "used by the public."214 The ruling of many of the courts 
at this time indicated that all takings would require compensation, and 
that they would make determinations as to valid public use.21S 
A trend towards compensation for takings, and a narrowing of 
the definition of public use, grew out of what J.A.C. Grant called the 
"higher law" background of eminent domain, and such protections 
seemed to represent a triumph of Lockean ideology.216 According to 
Grant, there existed in the nineteenth century a higher or natural the­
ory oflaw that stood in contrast to the positive law.217 This natural 
law stood behind state laws and constitutions and recognized certain 
rights of individuals, including the right to property.218 The concept 
of a natural right to property, influenced by Locke's political philoso­
phy, contlicted with state eminent domain law which, until then, had 
generally required compensation for takings. This natural law tradi­
tion was important in nineteenth century law and it represented a revi­
val of the belief that property rights were absolute, at least in common 
discourse.219 
These property rights were not political, as described by earlier 
Lockean-Liberallanguage, but economic, and the conservative wing of 
the jUdiciary argued that natural law required just compensation and 
that a public use limit be attached to eminent domain. In cases such 
as Gardner v. The Village ofNewburgh ,220 Chancellor Kent used natu­
ral·law reasoning to require compensation for land flooded when the 
village installed a public water system fed by a spring. In other cases 
involving dams, canals, and roads, the courts also required compensa­
tion based on similar natural law reasoning.221 
Grant cited numerous cases in the nineteenth century to show 
how just compensation was dictated by natural law in order to protect 
214. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837) (upholding transfer­
ring of eminent domain to the railroad because railroads were "used by the public."). Im­
plicit in the Bloodgood decision was a rejection of broader "for the public benefit" 
definitions of public use. Nichols noted that throughout the nineteenth century, "narrow" 
(used by the public) and "broad" (of public benefit) constructions of "public use" competed 
as rival interpretations of eminent domain, with the broad meaning eventually winning out. 
Nichols, supra note 185, at 617-23. 
215. M. HORWITZ, supra note 108, at 259-65. 
216. Grant, supra note 139. 
217. Id. at 68. 
218. Id. 
219. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in 
the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221, 225-26 (1987). 
220. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
221. Grant, supra note 139, at 72-73. 
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property.222 Grant noted how Chancellor Kent, as early as 1832, 
wished to apply the federal Bill of Rights to the states and make the 
fifth amendment just compensation requirement apply to New 
York.223 From the middle 1800s to the end ofthe century, New York 
and other state courts narrowed the meaning of public use by limiting 
legislative discretion to determine its meaning. 224 After 1800 and 
clearly by the Civil War, more and more states had constitutional pub­
lic use and just compensation provisions to protect private property.22S 
By 1897, natural law arguments led the United States Supreme Court 
to apply the fifth amendment just compensation clause to the states. 226 
CoNCLUSION 
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries eminent do­
main was recognized as a valid power of the states to acquire property 
for public projects, often without judicial scrutiny, and without com­
pensation or public use limitations.227 Early American history on 
property rights does not indicate that either the courts or the legisla­
tures were initially great defenders of property against eminent do­
main or other forms of regulation. Property rights did not 
significantly limit state legislative activity, and state court decisions 
increased eminent domain power at the expense of these rights. 
Lockean-Liberal rhetoric indicated that property rights were ab­
solute political limits upon legislative activity.228 Property rights were 
also described as crucial elements to maintaining republican govern­
ment and individual liberty. This concept was abandoned at the state 
level soon after 1787. Despite the pronouncements of the Founders, 
property increasingly came to be described in economic terms and sub­
ject to regulation for the common good. State courts and state emi­
nent domain law were crucial in this early transformation of property 
rights. The taking of unimproved land for mills or railroads, without 
compensation, was permitted as a valid public use, even if the taking 
primarily benefitted another private party. 
In the 1820s, 1830s, and later, numerous jurists changed the 
meaning of and strengthened property rights and put limits on emi­
nent domain. While acknowledging that property was an economic 
222. Id. at 71-77. 
223. Id. at 76-77. 
224. Id. at 79-81. 
225. Id. at 80-85. 
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good subject to legal regulation, state judges argued that natural laws 
protecting property mandated that all takings of private property 
would require compensation and would have to be for public use (with 
judges determining what a valid public use was, and often ruling on 
non-Lockean grounds). Additionally, during this time period, state 
constitutions were rewritten with compensation and public use clauses 
codifying and extending changes made in the courts. 
Examination of colonial political theories and state litigation 
reveals the deficiencies of current and popular interpretations of 
American political thOUght stressing either the Lockean or Republican 
origins and character of the American Founding. The existence of 
Blackstone's legal and conventional views on property suggests that a 
political language other than the Lockean or Republican theories in­
fluenced early American political descriptions of property, the crea­
tion of political institutions, and the definition of a legal apparatus to 
govern the United States. 
Neither Republican nor Lockean rhetoric, both of which treated 
property as a political claim, can account for the transformation of 
property into an economic commodity subject to regulation for the 
common good, and perhaps a legalistic tradition indebted to Black­
stone can not do so either. The definition of property in the nineteenth 
century United States departed so significantly from earlier Republi­
can or Liberal ideological concepts that it is difficult to describe the 
legacy of American political institutions as essentially Liberal or Re­
publican. While the Founders might in some contexts have said that 
property was an absolute political right, in other contexts some lesser 
view of property held sway. However, the subsequent treatment of 
property in American law indicates that this lesser view of property 
was either replaced by another conception of property, or that the 
Founders' political rhetoric did not adequ~tely describe how they ac­
ted upon their statements when it came time to create political institu­
tions. In effect, they often followed one view about property in 
political discourse, but acted differently when it came to treating prop­
erty institutionally. Perhaps some ,hybrid language is the reality of 
early America, with the Founders adopting and blending often contra­
dictory views on certain ideas or concepts, including property. 229 At 
the core of the American legal view of property is a tradition that 
embodies contradictory or mUltiple meanings that compete for recog­
nition in the constitution and in our legal tradition.230 
229. M. LIENESCH, supra note 14, at 7-9, made a similar claim. 
230. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea ofProperty, 72 
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Whatever the reality of the meaning of property in America, 
neither Republican nor Lockean language can adequately describe 
how these theories moved from the level of political rhetoric, perme­
ated political consciousness, and were translated into social reality. 
Neither of the major philosophical schools which adopts a Lockean or 
Republican view of the American Founding has thus far shown how 
individuals acted upon specific rhetoric, unless the articulation of rhet­
oric is considered a political act.231 Property rights, in either Republi­
can or Liberal thought, may have been thought of as politically 
important to individual liberty and as limits upon legislative power; 
yet the practice of eminent domain and other regulations questions the 
viability of using either the Lockean or Republican theories as exclu­
sive and satisfactory interpretations of American politics with regard 
to legal practice. 
The legal rhetoric of Blackstone demonstrates better than Locke 
or Republicanism an influence of greater depth as American institu­
tions were formed by judges and legislators. In effect, state court juris­
prudence and judicial activism highlight the transformation and 
articulation of property rights rhetoric into American political institu­
tions, and serve as examples of how to chart the diffusion of specific 
political ideologies into political practice. 
IOWA L. REv. 1319, 1319-21 (1987) (similar claim regarding dual constitutional tradition 
as to the meaning and role of property rights in American society). 
231. Of course, the articulation of rhetoric is sometimes considered a political act in 
revolutionary situations. 
